You’re reading what happened but ignoring its legal implications
I’m not ignoring what Kavanaugh said. I know exactly what he said and how he as an individual feels. That does not mean a majority of the justices feel the same way. It’s not clear, for example, how the NCAA can have a monopoly on football player services when multiple leagues have come and gone that employed athletes -with their own restrictive eligibility rules, including the NFL! That the NCAA and FBS football has been incredibly successful is a testament to the product, not because other leagues cannot employ 18+ year old football players. That is a ridiculous argument on its face. Other leagues cannot survive because they have an inferior product. Also, whether players are employees seems like it needs to be established first before “pay” or “labor” law is discussed, and will have wide ranging implications for athletic departments, some of which may be negative.
Kavanaugh likes beer, but he does not like college football, and he is apparently fine with other football leagues anti-competitive practices. Fine. Here is his sole opinion on the matter which you have extrapolated to the opinion of the other justices.
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring.
The NCAA has long restricted the compensation and ben- efits that student athletes may receive. And with surpris- ing success, the NCAA has long shielded its compensation rules from ordinary antitrust scrutiny. Today, however, the Court holds that the NCAA has violated the antitrust laws. The Court’s decision marks an important and overdue course correction, and I join the Court’s excellent opinion in full.
But this case involves only a narrow subset of the NCAA’s compensation rules—namely, the rules restricting the education-related benefits that student athletes may re- ceive, such as post-eligibility scholarships at graduate or vocational schools. The rest of the NCAA’s compensation rules are not at issue here and therefore remain on the books. Those remaining compensation rules generally re-
strict student athletes from receiving compensation or ben- efits from their colleges for playing sports. And those rules have also historically restricted student athletes from re- ceiving money from endorsement deals and the like.
I add this concurring opinion to underscore that the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also raise serious questions under the antitrust laws. Three points warrant emphasis.
First, the Court does not address the legality of the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules. As the Court says, “the student-athletes do not renew their across-the-board challenge to the NCAA’s compensation restrictions. Ac- cordingly, we do not pass on the rules that remain in place or the district court’s judgment upholding them. Our re- view is confined to those restrictions now enjoined.” Ante, at 14.
Second, although the Court does not weigh in on the ulti- mate legality of the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules, the Court’s decision establishes how any such rules should be analyzed going forward. After today’s decision, the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules should receive ordi- nary “rule of reason” scrutiny under the antitrust laws. The Court makes clear that the decades-old “stray comments” about college sports and amateurism made in National Col- legiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85 (1984), were dicta and have no bearing on whether the NCAA’s current compensation rules are law- ful. Ante, at 21. And the Court stresses that the NCAA is not otherwise entitled to an exemption from the antitrust laws. Ante, at 23–24; see also Radovich v. National Foot- ball League, 352 U. S. 445, 449–452 (1957). As a result, ab- sent legislation or a negotiated agreement between the NCAA and the student athletes, the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules should be subject to ordinary rule of reason scrutiny. See ante, at 18–19.
Third, there are serious questions whether the NCAA’s
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remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordi- nary rule of reason scrutiny. Under the rule of reason, the NCAA must supply a legally valid procompetitive justifica- tion for its remaining compensation rules. As I see it, how- ever, the NCAA may lack such a justification.
The NCAA acknowledges that it controls the market for college athletes. The NCAA concedes that its compensation rules set the price of student athlete labor at a below-mar- ket rate. And the NCAA recognizes that student athletes currently have no meaningful ability to negotiate with the NCAA over the compensation rules.
The NCAA nonetheless asserts that its compensation rules are procompetitive because those rules help define the product of college sports. Specifically, the NCAA says that colleges may decline to pay student athletes because the de- fining feature of college sports, according to the NCAA, is that the student athletes are not paid.
In my view, that argument is circular and unpersuasive. The NCAA couches its arguments for not paying student athletes in innocuous labels. But the labels cannot disguise the reality: The NCAA’s business model would be flatly il- legal in almost any other industry in America. All of the restaurants in a region cannot come together to cut cooks’ wages on the theory that “customers prefer” to eat food from low-paid cooks. Law firms cannot conspire to cabin lawyers’ salaries in the name of providing legal services out of a “love of the law.” Hospitals cannot agree to cap nurses’ income in order to create a “purer” form of helping the sick. News organizations cannot join forces to curtail pay to reporters to preserve a “tradition” of public-minded journalism. Movie studios cannot collude to slash benefits to camera crews to kindle a “spirit of amateurism” in Hollywood.
Price-fixing labor is price-fixing labor. And price-fixing labor is ordinarily a textbook antitrust problem because it extinguishes the free market in which individuals can oth- erwise obtain fair compensation for their work. See, e.g.,
4 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON KAVANAUGH, J., concurring
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5 (2006). Businesses like the NCAA cannot avoid the consequences of price-fixing la- bor by incorporating price-fixed labor into the definition of the product. Or to put it in more doctrinal terms, a monop- sony cannot launder its price-fixing of labor by calling it product definition.
The bottom line is that the NCAA and its member col- leges are suppressing the pay of student athletes who col- lectively generate billions of dollars in revenues for colleges every year. Those enormous sums of money flow to seem- ingly everyone except the student athletes. College presi- dents, athletic directors, coaches, conference commission- ers, and NCAA executives take in six- and seven-figure salaries. Colleges build lavish new facilities. But the stu- dent athletes who generate the revenues, many of whom are African American and from lower-income backgrounds, end up with little or nothing. See Brief for African Ameri- can Antitrust Lawyers as Amici Curiae 13–17.
Everyone agrees that the NCAA can require student ath- letes to be enrolled students in good standing. But the NCAA’s business model of using unpaid student athletes to generate billions of dollars in revenue for the colleges raises serious questions under the antitrust laws. In particular, it is highly questionable whether the NCAA and its member colleges can justify not paying student athletes a fair share of the revenues on the circular theory that the defining characteristic of college sports is that the colleges do not pay student athletes. And if that asserted justification is una- vailing, it is not clear how the NCAA can legally defend its remaining compensation rules.
If it turns out that some or all of the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules violate the antitrust laws, some diffi- cult policy and practical questions would undoubtedly en- sue. Among them: How would paying greater compensation to student athletes affect non-revenue-raising sports? Could student athletes in some sports but not others receive
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compensation? How would any compensation regime com- ply with Title IX? If paying student athletes requires some- thing like a salary cap in some sports in order to preserve competitive balance, how would that cap be administered? And given that there are now about 180,000 Division I stu- dent athletes, what is a financially sustainable way of fairly compensating some or all of those student athletes?
Of course, those difficult questions could be resolved in ways other than litigation. Legislation would be one option. Or colleges and student athletes could potentially engage in collective bargaining (or seek some other negotiated agree- ment) to provide student athletes a fairer share of the rev- enues that they generate for their colleges, akin to how pro- fessional football and basketball players have negotiated for a share of league revenues. Cf. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U. S. 231, 235–237 (1996); Wood v. National Bas- ketball Assn., 809 F. 2d 954, 958–963 (CA2 1987) (R. Win- ter, J.). Regardless of how those issues ultimately would be resolved, however, the NCAA’s current compensation re- gime raises serious questions under the antitrust laws.
To be sure, the NCAA and its member colleges maintain important traditions that have become part of the fabric of America—game days in Tuscaloosa and South Bend; the packed gyms in Storrs and Durham; the women’s and men’s lacrosse championships on Memorial Day weekend; track and field meets in Eugene; the spring softball and baseball World Series in Oklahoma City and Omaha; the list goes on. But those traditions alone cannot justify the NCAA’s decision to build a massive money-raising enterprise on the backs of student athletes who are not fairly compensated. Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different. The NCAA is not above the law.
