Well
@Some guy , it appears you largely are correct that currently existing law
and precedent (key thing) does not support my vision, as is.
On purely technical grounds, it would require either a new law
or a new court ruling. I would consider a new court ruling to not be the same thing as what you were saying, but overall I award you the point for the spirit of what you were getting at.
I don't expect you or anyone to read all (or any) of this. The TL;DR is that you were more right than wrong, and I was more wrong than right.
*****
(As always with these things, take with as many grains of salt as you need and/or dismiss as desired)
Prompt:
Would it be possible for major college football to in some way become a singular entity that does all of the following without there needing to be a new act by the US Congress? 1. employees college football players at the respective universities included in the new regime, 2. collectively bargains with a players union that requires all players to be members, and 3. collectively owns the television broadcasting rights to all home games. Elaborate on the following in your response: US laws against price fixing and antitrust, special legal exemptions granted to the NFL that enable its structure that could not simply be copied by this new regime, and if college players would have incentive to join such a new regime given the requirement to join a collective bargaining union.
Answer:
1) Employment Status and Unionization
Current law on college athletes & employment
Right now, most college athletes—including FBS football players—are
not legally classified as employees of their universities for purposes of federal employment and labor law. This means they generally
cannot unionize under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because unions under U.S. law (and collective bargaining rights) are tied to employment relationships. Courts have repeatedly held that the NCAA and member schools aren’t employers in this context. The NCAA and schools have fought to avoid having athletes qualify as employees, partly because that would trigger wages, benefits, unemployment insurance, and labor rights.
Ropes & Gray
There
are active legal efforts and litigation aimed at having athletes declared employees (e.g., via the National Labor Relations Board or courts), but those have not established a stable, broad-based employment status yet.
Why unionization and a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) matter
Under general U.S. antitrust law (Sherman Act),
independent organizations colluding to set wages or labor terms can be illegal price fixing. However:
- Professional leagues avoid this because players are employees and have unions. The collective bargaining process is protected from antitrust liability by the non-statutory labor exemption, which recognizes that CBAs inherently restrain competition in ways that labor law authorizes. Ropes & Gray+1
- College athletes currently lack that legal shield because they are not widely recognized as employees and do not have a certified bargaining unit. This means coordinated action by universities to fix wages or employment terms could trigger antitrust challenges. The Hastings Law Firm
So under present law,
players could not be compelled to join a union and bargain as a single block unless they are truly employees and have a certified union. That status itself would be a major legal fight with unpredictable outcomes.
2) Antitrust Law and “Price Fixing”
Sherman Act basics
U.S. antitrust law (primarily the Sherman Antitrust Act) forbids most concerted actions by competitors to set prices, wages, or other terms that restrict competition in a labor market or commercial market. Universities acting together to set athlete compensation could legally be seen as employers colluding—i.e.,
illegal wage-fixing—if they are recognized as employers. Since athletes aren’t employees now, the antitrust laws apply with
full force.
Ropes & Gray
Athletic unions & the labor exemption
In professional sports:
- A genuine CBA between a league and a players union creates a “labor exemption” from antitrust liability for those jointly-bargained terms. Congressional Research
- Without a union/CBA, any coordinated compensation regime across schools risks antitrust actions by players or third parties. The Hastings Law Firm
This is a fundamental structural difference:
the NFL and other professional leagues don’t have to worry about antitrust liability for their pay and rules because players are employees and protect those arrangements through collective bargaining.
So to meet your two conditions (employment + union + collective bargaining), that
entity would need players treated as employees—and that status would likely have to be affirmed by courts or law.
3) Collective Ownership of Television Rights
Current structure
College football broadcasting rights are negotiated at the conference or school level (e.g., SEC, Big Ten, ACC, etc.), not by a single nationwide league. Historically the
NCAA did try to sell TV rights centrally (e.g., the College Football Association), but the Supreme Court in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma ruled that the NCAA’s restrictions on member schools’ ability to sell rights collectively were an unreasonable restraint of trade under antitrust law.
Because of that decision, current rights are sold by individual conferences or schools—not as one bundled national package like the NFL’s rights.
Why college football can’t just collectivize rights
Under present law:
- Universities are separate businesses and competitors for TV markets, recruits, and fans.
- A single entity trying to bundle all rights centrally could be challenged as unlawful collusion among competitors unless (1) they are part of a broader statutory structure recognized by Congress, or (2) antitrust law is changed.
Unlike the
NFL, which has a
limited statutory broadcasters’ exemption (the
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961) that permits joint selling of TV rights by professional sports leagues,
college football does not currently have such an exemption.
Wikipedia
Even the NFL’s antitrust carve-outs are limited; the Sports Broadcasting Act
only allows pooling of broadcast rights and
does not immunize all league conduct from antitrust scrutiny.
Wikipedia
4) Special Legal Exemptions the NFL Has That a New College Entity Wouldn’t
Here’s what the NFL enjoys (but a self-organized college football combine would
not automatically receive):
a) Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
- This federal law allows professional leagues to pool broadcast rights and sell them collectively without violating antitrust law.
- College football is not covered by that act. Wikipedia
b) Non-statutory labor exemption
- Applies to pro leagues with employees and certified unions negotiating CBAs.
- A new college regime couldn’t benefit from this unless players were legal employees and a union certified. Congressional Research
c) MLB’s standalone antitrust exemption
- Major League Baseball uniquely enjoys a judicially recognized antitrust exemption for its business operations—a relic of an early 20th-century Supreme Court case—that no other major sport currently has. SCBC
College football has no such blanket exemption and thus faces full antitrust scrutiny on rights deals, wage restrictions, etc.
5) Would College Players Have Incentive to Join This Regime?
There would be
mixed incentives:
Potential benefits
- If players were employees with a union, they could bargain for guaranteed wages, benefits, health coverage, and pensions—like professional athletes.
- A union could give real voice and protections for safety, working conditions, and revenue sharing.
Potential drawbacks
- Being required to join a union is controversial. Some players might prefer individual marketing deals or NIL income outside union terms.
- College players’ goals vary: graduating, playing professionally, or balancing sports with education. Some might not want full-time employment status.
- A forced union might impose dues and rules (e.g., transfers, eligibility length) that players don’t all favor.
Legal uncertainty
- Without legal clarity on whether athletes are employees, some players might fear losing scholarships or tax advantages or triggering Title IX implications.
So whether players “would want” to join something like this depends on how it’s structured and whether the
benefits of employment and collective bargaining outweigh loss of individual autonomy.