No doubt, but every judge and jury member could be called an activist. Their individual beliefs, set of reasons or ideology defines how they interpret legislation - and legislation is horribly written or cannot account for every situation, like sports. Failing coherent legislation judges have to interpret this s***. So, my internet crank understanding is: sports’ anticompetitive collusions are subjected to “rule of reason“ when litigated. Because, or “it depends” (or depends on who you ask) doesn’t sound as sophisticated.
Kavanaugh said the NCAA monopsony should be subjected to the rule of reason analysis. Yep, fine. That analysis has seven (?) elements that have to answered in turn by the plaintiffs and defendants and the judge then issues a purely ideological opinion on most of them. What constitutes harm, damages, pro-competitive necessity for restraints or collusions. They are also supposed to take mitigating factors into account, collateral damages.
Reasonable people could have 180 degree opposite opinions on rules governing college sports and they would both be “right” because determining harm or determining future collateral damages to the product or market are ultimately pure opinion. Transfers, paying players, employee status, allowing tampering? Maybe no one thing destroys the sport or but slippery slope applies. First they came for unlimited transfers..
Brandeis on navigating this mess:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse, but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.