Is it crazy or genius to go for two with a late seven-point lead?

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Pompous Elitist

Pompous Elitist

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CBS Sports: Is it crazy or genius to go for two with a late seven-point lead?

Thought this deserved its own thread, as this is a topic largely ignored here. Double down, hit, or stay? The math (in our case) seems to say go for it. Do you feel lucky?


"I asked Harold Sackrowitz, a professor of statistics at Rutgers who authored a study called "Refining the After-Touchdown Decision," to examine the Minnesota situation. When Sackrowitz, who has studied two-point conversions since the 1990s, initially heard Minnesota's details, he said going for one was probably the better choice.

But then Sackrowitz examined win probability rates using different two-point conversion success rates and based on how many possessions are left in the game. The extra-point success rate in his calculations always stayed the same at 98.7 percent. (Minnesota didn't miss an extra point in 2015, nor on Thursday.)

Sackrowitz believes if a team up seven late is able to make two-point tries 35 percent or 44 percent of the time, the best strategy is to kick the PAT. But if that same scenario plays out and the team has a 50 percent success rate on two-point tries, his card says go for two.
"Getting into overtime is half a win; it doesn't mean you win," Sackrowitz said. "Avoiding overtime is not a bad idea.""

http://www.cbssports.com/college-fo...genius-to-go-for-two-with-a-seven-point-lead/
 

It also depends on who you are playing. If you are playing a team worse than you you are much less likely to lose in overtime....especially if you are better in the kicking game.

If you go for 1 there is almost a 0% chance of losing in regulation, if you go for 2 there is almost 0% chance...but it is much larger than if you had gone for one.
 


I like these against the grain thinkers. Little changes here and there that bring innovation to the stale game, and as with all change some will violently ridicule it. Mild and major adjustments like the forward pass, the counter trey, the read option, the triple option, the run and shoot, the outside zone, the southern hambone, the Airraid, the Briles power spread, the list of tweaks that went on to make coaches a lot of money is long and distinguished. Seems like it's often times the small school guys that are dreaming this stuff up and the big boys later implement it with superior talent. But for a short period of time you can gain that little bit of edge.

There have been a few different studies that say it makes mathematical sense to go for it on fourth down even in your own territory. Will we ever see a coach brave enough to stick to that kind of Basic Strategy long enough to see it bear fruit; something that flies in the face of gut instinct but makes mathematical sense?
 

It's not crazy, or genius. But if you assume that you will make the 2 point conversion 40% of the time (NCAA average) it's not a smart decision. If you make the 2 50% of the time, it is.

Bottom-line, it makes sense if you have more faith in your ability to make a 2-point conversion than stop one. With this team, that does not appear to be the case.
 


I opened the possibility of losing the game in regulation. It was stupid.
 

beavergopher said:
I opened the possibility of losing the game in regulation. It was stupid.
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I tend to agree with this. The only was I would do it is if you think the other team is clearly better than you and will likely score and then defeat you in overtime.

For instance, I might THINK ABOUT doing it in the same situation against Ohio State to try to end it...but I do not know if I would do it against Indiana State.


I think Oregon State is better than people give them credit for, but I would have kicked against them.
 

beavergopher said:
I opened the possibility of losing the game in regulation. It was stupid.
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Getting the two removes the possibility of losing, period. A team that can score a TD in a minute is a decent bet to get a two and tie. Anything can happen in OT

At most, the decision swings win probability a couple percent. Nowhere near enough for the outrage it caused. I would think the Mitch running backwards would get more debate.
 




Percentages aside, I liked it because they've now attempted it in an actual game, not in a practice situation. Maybe helpful down the road.
 

There can be a simpler explanation.

Look at it from a "control your own destiny" point of view. It is similar to going for it on forth down with the lead and 1 minute to play. If you make it, you ended the game. It really boils down to an aggressive playing to win mentality in place of playing not to lose. It all has to do with the confidence in your ability to succeed.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 


I'm okay with going for 2...but

However, I'll say it again...either the execution of the play or the play call itself (if run correctly) were poor. Much more disappointed in that than the decision to go for two.

Like someone above said and I said earlier...what in the world is the logic in giving up 25, 35, 45 yards of field position to then punt? We are brazen enough to go for 2? But timid enough we don't trust our guys to get a first down without fumbling? So instead, we'll attempt to drain 10 seconds off the clock but give them 30-40 yards of field position? The scary part is I think they practiced all these things.
 



Pompous Elitist said:
Thought this deserved its own thread, as this is a topic largely ignored here. Double down, hit, or stay? The math (in our case) seems to say go for it. Do you feel lucky?


"I asked Harold Sackrowitz, a professor of statistics at Rutgers who authored a study called "Refining the After-Touchdown Decision," to examine the Minnesota situation. When Sackrowitz, who has studied two-point conversions since the 1990s, initially heard Minnesota's details, he said going for one was probably the better choice.

But then Sackrowitz examined win probability rates using different two-point conversion success rates and based on how many possessions are left in the game. The extra-point success rate in his calculations always stayed the same at 98.7 percent. (Minnesota didn't miss an extra point in 2015, nor on Thursday.)

Sackrowitz believes if a team up seven late is able to make two-point tries 35 percent or 44 percent of the time, the best strategy is to kick the PAT. But if that same scenario plays out and the team has a 50 percent success rate on two-point tries, his card says go for two.
"Getting into overtime is half a win; it doesn't mean you win," Sackrowitz said. "Avoiding overtime is not a bad idea.""

http://www.cbssports.com/college-fo...genius-to-go-for-two-with-a-seven-point-lead/
Click to expand...

Great article on coach who never punts on 4th down...and focuses on other statistically favorable things like turnovers...pretty compelling. Similar to why TC always receives opening kick-off when able to choose.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ach-who-never-punts-has-another-radical-idea/
 


Claeys made a great point on this topic, he said even if they fail on the 2 point conversion and have a 7 point lead, if the other team scores they are more than likely go for the one point conversion and take it to OT as opposed to going for two and the win. I think he's correct on that point. I personally give Claeys credit for his aggressive approach.
 

mkAz said:
Claeys made a great point on this topic, he said even if they fail on the 2 point conversion and have a 7 point lead, if the other team scores they are more than likely go for the one point conversion and take it to OT as opposed to going for two and the win. I think he's correct on that point. I personally give Claeys credit for his aggressive approach.
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I do wonder though, if it was reversed, would he go for the tie or win? If true to his convictions, he should go for two, yes?
 

If you assume that both teams convert 2 pt tries 40% of the time, you should kick the extra point every time in that situation. Either way the game was going to come down to a two point conversion. By going for two you are picking a 40% chance of winning the game on offense over a 60% chance of winning the game on defense.
 


It's a low risk play with a big payoff. Gain 3 yards and the game is over. Fail to convert and you are giving the other team one chance to come back from a 7 point deficit. Claeys has tried this twice now. Got the two points against Illinois last year and ended that game. Failed to get the two points last week and watched his defense successfully protect the lead. He's 2-0 using this approach. It does generate an awful lot of discussion. I suppose if the approach ever ends up in a loss, I might second guess him. But I doubt it. I like the aggressiveness of it, and I also like that it drives some people crazy.
 

PMWinSTP said:
I do wonder though, if it was reversed, would he go for the tie or win? If true to his convictions, he should go for two, yes?
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No, this does not follow. In scenario number one, going for two is not a win/lose proposition. Going for two is a chance to win, and if not successful, still have a great chance to win if the defense does its job. If it's reversed and Claeys is faced with one point to tie and go to OT, or two to win, he will most often take the one and OT. He would rightfully only go for two if he's up against a much superior opponent and likes his two point call. The major difference in the two scenarios is failing to get the two points in scenario one, will still most likely result in a win. Failing in scenario two will always result in a loss.
 

Old Goph said:
No, this does not follow. In scenario number one, going for two is not a win/lose proposition. Going for two is a chance to win, and if not successful, still have a great chance to win if the defense does its job. If it's reversed and Claeys is faced with one point to tie and go to OT, or two to win, he will most often take the one and OT. He would rightfully only go for two if he's up against a much superior opponent and likes his two point call. The major difference in the two scenarios is failing to get the two points in scenario one, will still most likely result in a win. Failing in scenario two will always result in a loss.
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Michigan game last year gives an answer.
 

PMWinSTP said:
Great article on coach who never punts on 4th down...and focuses on other statistically favorable things like turnovers...pretty compelling. Similar to why TC always receives opening kick-off when able to choose.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ach-who-never-punts-has-another-radical-idea/
Click to expand...

Fascinating. Then this happened Sept 2015: Pulaski Academy (Arkansas) went to powerhouse Highland Park (Dallas TX), that of Doak Walker and Matthew Stafford, and mopped the floor with them, breaking Highland Park's 84 game home win streak. But they did punt for the first time in 2 years, facing 4th and 30 in their territory. They have won the AR state championship 3 out of the last 5 years. I love this stuff.

http://sportsday.dallasnews.com/hig...streak-snapped-unorthodox-pulaski-academy-ark




.
 

A follow-up to your excellent link PM:

The crazy part about Kelley’s system is it isn’t crazy at all. It’s based entirely on math. Each yard line has an expected point value. Each down-and-distance has an expected rate of success. Punting average is easily calculated, as is punt return average. Years of football data have created these numbers, and while they differ between high school, college and the NFL, they do not differ as much as you might think. It’s fairly easy to use these numbers to create a do-I-go-for-it-on-fourth-down formula similar to the do-I-hit probability combinations in blackjack. Two years ago, Paul Dalen wrote an excellent piece at SB Nation’s Football Study Hall explaining the math behind Pulaski Academy’s madness. Here’s a snippet in which Dalen explains why a team should go for a particular fourth down from the 50-yard line.

In the example above, the fourth-down spot is the 50-yard line. The expected P(conv) is .50, the team’s average punt (chosen for example purposes) is 40 yards and the opponent’s average return is 10 yards. In this scenario, the expected point value of going for it is 0.0 points, and the expected opponent point value of punting is minus-1.8 points. Zero is more than minus-1.8, so going for it is justified.

For most of us, decades spent watching football played a certain way has taught us that the only prudent choice is to punt and play defense. But the math indicates that punting is actually the riskier choice.

So, why are college coaches—especially the ones whose teams are likely to lose most of their Power Five-versus-Power Five games anyway—so reluctant to try something the math suggests could work? Another byproduct of watching the Bruins play is that it becomes impossible to keep from yelling at the television when a team punts on fourth-and-two from its 45-yard line. For example, in Purdue’s 41–31 loss at Marshall on Sunday, the Boilermakers punted on fourth-and-five from the 50-yard line in the waning seconds of the first half. The Thundering Herd would have had precious little time to get in position for a field goal, but Purdue—which had just completed an 11-yard pass on third down—might have gained 15 or 20 yards and set up a field goal attempt of its own. The math favored the engineering school, but the Boilermakers punted anyway. After seeing Pulaski Academy play in person, I imagine this sort of thing will drive me crazy from this point forward.

Read the rest:
http://www.campusrush.com/kevin-kelley-pulaski-academy-power-of-not-punting-1338619200.html
 



Would Oregon St. go for 2?

I doubt it.

I liked Claeys call. It's game one OOC game. Give the offense a chance (or force) them to end the game on their terms.
 

beavergopher said:
I opened the possibility of losing the game in regulation. It was stupid.
Click to expand...

It also opened up the possibility of pretty much guaranteeing a win. I wonder what percentage of teams go for 2 when down by 1 late in a game.
 

Old Goph said:
Possibly, but in that case they only needed one yard. I'm guessing he'll usually go for it in that situation.
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I guess a couple yards might change his mind, but do the odds change much?
 

The play call was a head scratcher. Johnson was covered like a blanket and his route didn't even have him in the end zone. Gophers didn't run any reverse direction calls all night. This would have been a perfect time. I was fine with the call, not the play. Johnson has a lot to prove in these next couple of games.
 

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