When a team travels to Iowa, records are almost always thrown out the window. Opponents must execute a strong gameplan to leave Kinnick Stadium with a victory. During Saturday’s 23-19 loss to the Hawkeyes, Minnesota fell into a quick 20-3 hole. The Gophers’ offense had to modify its style and climb uphill the entire night. Iowa executed a very strong gameplan and got off to a quick start. Once Minnesota was placed in passing downs, they had to deploy longer developing routes. As a result, quarterback Tanner Morgan needed to take deeper drops against a physical and athletic defensive line. Future first-round pick A.J. Epenesa had a dominant game and was disruptive the entire day. He posted 2.5 sacks, nine pressures and tallied a 28 percent pass rush win rate, according to Pro Football Focus. When Iowa got Minnesota into long down-and-distance situations, the pass rush thrived.
On Saturday, the Gophers were unable to use the complete heavy personnel package, which features six offensive linemen. With right guard Curtis Dunlap Jr. out, they didn’t have full player availability. The coaches countered by having tight ends help on the left side, but it wasn’t nearly as valuable. When Dunlap Jr. is healthy, they have more physicality/gaps and can help slow the pass rush. The package was quietly a big reason why Minnesota had so much success throwing vertically against Penn State. In a similar matchup featuring length and athleticism, the Gophers didn’t have the personnel to maximize this type of package. Throughout the day, A.J. Epenesa and Chauncey Golston asserted themselves and took advantage of being in frequent pass-rushing situations.
Minnesota managed to move the ball downfield and thrived with several vertical route concepts. Tyler Johnson had three deep grabs, including a touchdown. They did a nice job of stretching the seam, working the sideline and stressing the soft spots of Iowa’s coverage scheme. The second clip below was an instance where the Gophers caught the Hawkeyes in single-high. In the last touchdown clip, the safety bites on the RPO play-fake and Johnson shreds up the seam. Throughout the day, Morgan placed the ball really well downfield and froze the second/third levels of Iowa’s defense with play-fakes.
The redshirt sophomore quarterback completed 25 of his 36 passes for 368 yards and three touchdowns. As expected, the Gophers managed to move the ball through the air against the Hawkeyes’ secondary. The biggest problems Minnesota had included: red zone offense, drops and a lack of rushing success.
Aside from the ground game, Minnesota actually led all key categories within the advanced box score. Minnesota held a 0.2321 to 0.143 advantage in overall EPA, according to College Football Data. They also won the success rate battle: 44% to 42%. For this metric, success is determined by achieving 50 percent of necessary yardage on first down, 70 percent on second down, and 100 percent on third and fourth down, per Football Outsiders.
One of the key differences in this game was Minnesota’s red zone offense. The Gophers had to settle for two field goals inside the 10-yard-line. One of which was the result of deciding to kick a 20-yard field goal right before halftime. The analytics would favor going for it in this situation. However, with the way the first half went, I think this was the correct move. It’s always important to balance the numbers with the current pulse of your team. P.J. Fleck wanted to make sure his squad entered the break facing a two-possession deficit. Minnesota had the football out of halftime and Fleck’s decision clearly involved having faith his team would score on the opening drive of the second half. If the Gophers didn’t get the ball first, I would have went for the touchdown.
I often don’t like analyzing decisions because it’s easy to look back upon them now. However, I wanted to provide some insight into the analytics of just one moment in this game. When it comes to in-game decisions in this matchup, if I were tasked with giving suggestions, I would have handled one thing differently — the 50-yard field goal attempt in the first half. In this instance (if I was helping with game management), I would suggest to punt deep and flip the field. There are several variables at play here, including the long down-and-distance and Minnesota’s inexperienced kicker.
Before the play, the expected points added number was 1.34 on 4th-and-13 from the Iowa 32. The missed field goal meant Iowa started the drive with 1.48 expected points. The figures for each yard-line and down are determined by College Football Data’s model, which uses a sampling of college football play-by-play data over the past ten years. When you take the inverse of this number for Minnesota (-1.48) and subtract it from the Gophers’ original expected points added figure, the total is -2.82 EPA.
Conversely, if Minnesota decided to punt and pinned Iowa on its own 10-yard-line, the EPA would be -1.5. So as a result, punting vs. kicking a field goal would have provided a net difference of -1.32 EPA. The Hawkeyes took the next possession up the field and scored a touchdown to grab an early 13-0 lead. Fleck clearly wanted to have faith in his kicker to execute. I understand why he made the decision. However, out of all the moves in this game, I would have advised taking a slightly different approach in this situation. Again, numbers are just a suggestion and Fleck knows better than anyone how his team will execute in these moments.
I also wanted to examine Fleck’s decision to onside kick with 3:27 remaining. The numbers are actually interesting regarding onside kicks. When your win probability is below 15 percent, the success rate of an onside kick dwindles significantly (about 20 percent success rate), according to Brian Burke and Harvard studies. If teams are expecting an onside kick, the recovery rate is much lower. At this specific moment, the Gophers still had a win probability of 27 percent, according to CollegeFootballData. Based upon Brian Burke’s onside kick data, the success rate of recovery when holding a 27 percent win probability is actually near 60 percent.
ESPN’s win probability metric was around 14 percent before the onside kick, so when using their numbers, the Gophers had about a 27 percent chance of recovering.
If Minnesota still had two or three timeouts, I would have certainly suggested to kick deep. People also need to consider the Hawkeyes’ approach if they were deeper in their own territory. Iowa may have decided to throw the ball once to put the game away. It seems unlikely, but it’s something you have to consider.
If Minnesota didn’t recover the onside kick, Fleck obviously believed the Hawkeyes would run the ball three times. He valued being more certain he would get the ball back, especially considering he only had one timeout available. The bigger issue that complicated the onside kick decision was the fact they had to use a timeout on the previous drive. With one more timeout, the approach probably would have changed and Minnesota’s eventual field position could have improved.
People also need to understand P.J. Fleck’s decision to run onto the field didn’t have an adverse impact on the game. It was a dead ball penalty and had nothing to do with the Gophers’ ability to retain possession in the red zone. He was checking on a player and apparently caught the official off-guard by sprinting onto the field. Wide receiver Tyler Johnson dropping the pass is a bigger issue. If Johnson makes the play, he possibly scores and ties the game at 20 late in the third quarter. Earlier in the game, Rashod Bateman also had a critical drop on 2nd-and-18. If he caught the pass, he probably would have scored. A few small mistakes really haunted the Gophers as they tried to battle back. Despite all of the errors and an early first half deficit, Minnesota still had a chance to win at the end.
Defensively, the Gophers played a heavy mix of zone coverage in the first half. It’s clear Minnesota wanted to limit explosive plays and made an effort to provide Iowa with intermediate passing lanes. There were some instances where Minnesota appeared to play some man underneath, with zone over-the-top. They also dropped eight or seven once and awhile to help in coverage. Quarterback Nate Stanley played a tremendous game and made some NFL-caliber throws. On the first touchdown pass, the corner route perfectly attacked Minnesota’s zones. The second touchdown play was the result of a mesh concept (crossing routes) that set a pick and got Minnesota’s second-level caught up in traffic.
Iowa deserves credit for how well they schemed the Gophers. Not only did they take deep shots when Minnesota was playing aggressive coverages, but they did a nice job of mixing rushing looks. The Gophers had trouble maintaining gap discipline and tackling well. Against this type of stretch/outside zone scheme, the goal is to horizontally displace defenders and run them out of gaps. In the clip below, an edge contain issue and missed tackle led to an explosive play.
Iowa did a nice job of executing and Minnesota either missed tackles, lost edge contain or ran out of a gap. The Hawkeyes also used misdirection occasionally, especially when the Gophers were packing the box to slow the run.
Minnesota likely wanted to play lighter coverage to limit the amount of 1-on-1 tackles they had to make in space/alley via man situations. By playing zone, they were able to keep things in front of them and limit the probability of explosive plays. When Minnesota was aggressive with man coverages, Iowa took shots deep.
Out of halftime, the Gophers decided to challenge Iowa’s wide receivers, while sending more front-seven pressure. Joe Rossi almost immediately sent Thomas Barber off a blitz and also deployed a stunt look out of the NASCAR package. Minnesota knew they had to start taking some chances to get themselves back in it. Just one takeaway could have changed the entire game.
During this pressure package, the Gophers stunted Boye Mafe and Kamal Martin. The right guard and tackle open their shoulders and are unable to stay square. Mafe bends inside and splits them beautifully. This helped Kamal Martin loop inside and sack Nate Stanley. On the opposite side, Carter Coughlin and Tai’yon Devers also ran a stunt, which pressed the middle of Iowa’s offensive line.
Later in second half, Joe Rossi dialed up a similar look, but blitzed Braelen Oliver off the edge. Oliver blew up the running back in pass protection and sacked Nate Stanley.
The Gophers decided to be more aggressive in the second half and it forced Nate Stanley to make more difficult throws. Overall, the tackling was a little better and they were more consistent with edge discipline. Minnesota probably made the defensive adjustments a little too late and it allowed Iowa to build an early lead. However, the Hawkeyes dialed up a strong scheme, including superb route concepts and rushing game creativity.
Despite all of the mistakes, the Gophers had a shot to win the game with less than two minutes remaining. Even without executing well, the Gophers showed they could compete with a talented squad on the road. Now, the entire team must learn from this game and prepare for huge matchups against Northwestern and Wisconsin.